Study to kick-start highway bill lobbying

By Jim Snyder - The Hill - January 15, 2008
Business groups are looking at Tuesday’s release of a transportation study as a start-your-engines moment to what is likely to be one of the most aggressively lobbied highway bills in recent memory.

A panel of public and private officials who reviewed the country’s transportation needs for the past two years wrote the long-awaited report. Congress formed the National Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue Study Commission in the last highway bill.

“Every stakeholder in the transportation industry … has been waiting for this report to come out,” said Janet Kavinoky, director of transportation infrastructure at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.

“Nothing like this has been done before,” said Rosario Palmieri, vice president for infrastructure policy at the National Association of Manufacturers.

The report will examine all four components of the transportation infrastructure system: freight rail lines, highways and bridges, ports, and mass transit systems.

The current highway bill lasts until 2009, but lobbyists anticipate the debate over surface transportation will begin this year given the rising importance of transportation bottlenecks on operating costs. An anticipated $4 billion shortfall in transportation accounts in 2008 is also likely to drive the transportation debate on Capitol Hill.

One key element of the debate is whether the gas tax should be significantly increased to help pay for new spending.

Under the plan endorsed by a majority of panel members, the federal share of transportation spending would increase from 37 percent to 40 percent, according to one lobbyist.

There is a broad coalition of forces arrayed in support of tax increases, but increasing the gas tax is likely to remain politically difficult.

“A special commission came up with an old, cold, bad idea,” said Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), the ranking member on the Senate Finance Committee. “This is a disappointment and probably even a big waste of tax dollars,” Grassley said in a statement anticipating the panel’s report.

Transportation lobbyists said the committee itself was split on the need to raise taxes. The Bush administration opposes a tax hike, and current Transportation Secretary Mary Peters reportedly is one of the panel members to have argued against raising taxes as a way to spend more on infrastructure.

However, groups like NAM and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, normally allergic to tax hikes, in this case have joined contractors, civil engineers and others in support of higher user fees.

“This is a priority for [our members] as the costs for logistics are increasing much faster than they have before,” Palmieri said.

The issue of infrastructure spending “has never been more important to them. It is very high on the agenda,” he said.

He noted one estimate that congestion adds $8 billion a year in prices for consumer goods.

Kavinoky, who is also the executive director of Americans for Transportation Mobility, one of several infrastructure coalitions formed in anticipation of the next highway bill debate, defended the tax.

“Right now, a user fee is the simplest and most straight-forward way to collect revenues,” she said.

Even though the bulk of the new money would come from an increased gas tax, long the mainstay in transportation funding, business lobbyists also anticipate the report will recommend the sort of paradigm shift they were looking for.

One lobbyist, for example, expected the report to call for the creation of a permanent commission that would develop a transportation bill through a process that mirrors the Base Closure and Realignment Commission method Congress adopted to handle the politically sensitive work of closing military bases.

Under that scenario, Congress would approve or reject the commission’s transportation report. But lawmakers would not be able to amend the legislation.

The report is also expected to advocate for a performance-based matrix that would tie funding to improvements in safety, congestion and maintenance efforts.

“That is the equivalent of a massive earthquake in transportation policy,” Kavinoky said.

Kavinoky said federal dollars are distributed by program with little regard to how the money will improve performance.

A variety of other funding mechanisms are expected to be proposed by panel members to improve system performance.

Those are likely to include public-private partnerships for toll roads that are controversial in some quarters, and a transit tax to support expansion of public transportation programs.
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Sen. Lloyd Doggett faces off with Fed. Transportation Secretary Peters over Trans Texas Corridor and "Sell back to toll" Fed. Hwys

Thanks to Terri Hall of T.U.R.F. for forwarding this transcript
October 25, 2007 - U. S. House Budget Committee Holds Hearing on Surface Transportation Investment

DOGGETT:
Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Madam Secretary, for your testimony and your service. I must say that I'm a bit surprised by your use of the term "tax and spend," because, of course, as you know from your long career, the tax-and-spend approach had its origin under Dwight David Eisenhower, who felt that the National Interstate and Defense Highways Act should be paid for as you go, and that the pay-as-you-go approach was the appropriate one as the Highway Revenue Act was enacted at the same time in 1956.
It is true that in the last seven years on everything this administration has preferred a borrow-and-spend approach for all of our national needs. But it would seem to me that the more fiscally responsible one is to pay for our highways as we
determine we need them.
Now, there is an alternative model that Texas has really been pioneering with. And as you know, we have a governor in Texas who seems to have never met a highway that he didn't think he could toll. If he had his way, we would have toll roads blossoming in Texas like the wild flowers in the spring.
I have some concerns about the fact that the administration in its budget proposal really seems to want to incentivize more toll roads such as by its proposal to tax and spend for grants for high- tech electronic toll booths that would encourage states to use that means of finance.
Let me ask you if you support the requirement that no tolling occur on federal highways in the state of Texas or anywhere else.

PETERS:
Congressman, I'd be happy to answer your question. The answer is no, the administration does not support that provision, and let me explain why.

DOGGETT:
Well, because my time is short, and I'll give you an opportunity to elaborate at the end -- but do you support prohibiting states from buying back federal highways that the taxpayers have already paid for in order to toll those highways?

PETERS:
Congressman, we prefer to let states make those decisions, and I think one of the fundamental problems that we have today is that decision-making in too many
cases has been moved away from state and local government and decisions are being made at the federal level.

DOGGETT:
Well, I guess the concern is that these highways were paid for with federal tax dollars. You're proposing in your budget to encourage the states to toll more highways, and you've just indicated by your answers that you do not support restricting tolls on federal taxpayer-financed highways, and that approve of the practice of the states coming and buying back highways taxpayers have already paid for and tolling them.
And I find that to be very problematic and something that I'm hearing from many people in Texas is not the way to go. And the partner to the tollway on every highway that the taxpayers have already paid for in Texas is, of course, the very controversial Trans-Texas Corridor, where the same governor is proposing to take swaths of land as wide as 10 miles that would separate someone's century-owned farm or ranch home from their pastures and their field.
This has been a very secretive process. As you know, the House has also passed bipartisan language concerning the Trans-Texas Corridor.
Is there any federal money of any type going into the planning of the Trans-Texas Corridor at present?

PETERS:
Congressman, I will have to check on that. I know at one time there was, but let me check on that and get back to you.

DOGGETT:
All right. The approach of doing so much of this in secret and treating our farmers and ranchers as just so much road kill when it comes to participation in the process is one that I know bothered not only me -- bothers not only me but bothers members on both sides of the aisle here.
That's why the House overwhelmingly approved legislation directed to the so-called NAFTA superhighway. I know the administration doesn't concede there is such a highway.
But as relates to participation in working groups concerning the Trans-Texas Corridor and the NAFTA superhighway, if it's to extend beyond Texas, does the
administration support the amendment that the House overwhelmingly approved in that regard?

PETERS:
Congressman, I would say that we have not taken a position on that issue yet, but let me explain...

DOGGETT:
Well, we passed it a long time ago. Do you plan to take a position as this measure moves through conference one way or the other? Do you object to the restrictions that the House approved by a vote of 362-63 in July concerning this matter?

PETERS:
Congressman, we believe that state governments should have much more latitude than they have today to make decisions.

DOGGETT:
So it sounds to me like you want to give them the authority to have a secretive process, to build a 10-mile-wide highway, tearing up farms and ranches and rural communities where these people will not even be able to access the tollway, perhaps built by a foreign firm -- that as long as that's the state decision, you're content to let them do whatever they want to do?
I think we have some responsibility with federal tax dollars to try to safeguard property rights and involve the public in participation in these decisions.
Let me just close, because I can see my time is up, and I know the vote is under way, by also commenting about what you call your dirty little secret on earmarks.
It is not a dirty little secret that both of the federal transportation authorization acts were approved by Republican Congresses with Republican
chairs, that the so-called Bridge to Nowhere was the project -- a totally Republican project.
There is not one earmark in either of these transportation acts that would be there if this administration and the Republican leadership had wanted to cut them out.
Why is it that the administration has been so quiet for so long and has not done anything about these earmarks until the fact that we now finally have a Democratic Congress?

PETERS:
Well, Congressman, let me take two answers. First of all, with all respect, you misinterpreted my comments about the Trans- Texas Corridor.
Second, there is no NAFTA superhighway. There is no NAFTA superhighway at all. And we certainly believe in public disclosure as projects are developed.
This administration also has a long record, a long, long record, in speaking out against earmarks, speaking out against using the public's money in a way that is not publicly disclosed. And we will continue to stand behind that opposition.

DOGGETT:
Just specifically on the NAFTA superhighway, then, is there anything, since you believe in letting the states do essentially whatever they want in this area,
to prevent the Trans-Texas Corridor, when it goes from Mexico to the Oklahoma border, from being connected to an Oklahoma Trans-Oklahoma Corridor, and then a Kansas Trans-Kansas Corridor, all the way up to the Canadian border?

PETERS:
Congressman, there are restrictions about connecting to interstate highways, access points to interstate highways. Any time that a road accesses or intersects with an interstate highway, that does have to be approved.

DOGGETT:
But you are putting money into -- you have put money in the past into the Trans-Texas Corridor.

PETERS:
As I said sir, I will research that and get back to you.

DOGGETT:
I think you said you had done it in the past. You weren't sure if you were doing it now.

PETERS:
I said I thought we had, sir.

DOGGETT:
And you said that I have not correctly interpreted your comments about the Trans-Texas Corridor. Would you just elaborate on what your position is on the Trans-Texas Corridor?

PETERS:
I would be happy to, sir. We believe that there should be a full disclosure process, a process that involves not only the potential users of a highway but those who are affected by the highway. This is required by the National Environmental Protection Act.

And those types of processes, those open public processes, where the public has an opportunity to participate in decision-making, is absolutely something that we do support.

DOGGETT:
Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Madam Secretary.

Accountability 101 - Who's to Blame?

In the wake of the I-35W bridge collapse, it's time to take a hard look at the politicians and policies that may have contributed to the disaster
BY G.R. ANDERSON JR. AND PAUL DEMKO - Minneapolis/St. Paul City Pages - August 15, 2007
Amy Klobuchar, Minnesota's junior U.S. Senator, may have said it best: "A bridge in America just shouldn't fall down."

But shortly after 6 p.m. on August 1, one of them did. Anyone who reached the Mississippi river before Minneapolis police could cordon off a wide perimeter around the fallen I-35W bridge got a startling view of the disaster: smoke, sirens, choppers, cracked concrete, crushed cars, and the walking (and swimming) wounded.

During the frantic recovery efforts, politicians called a moratorium on finger-pointing. In a press conference 90 minutes after the collapse, Minneapolis Mayor R.T. Rybak and Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty pledged cooperation, despite their diametrically opposed politics.

It didn't last long. On August 2nd, Minnesota Congressman Jim Oberstar, a Democrat who chairs the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, assailed President George W. Bush from the House floor. In October 2003, Bush made a counter-offer on a transportation bill that left the budget for surface and bridge repair "still $90 billion below where his own Department of Transportation said it needed to be," Oberstar said. "This administration failed to support a robust investment in surface transportation and the funding to accompany it."

The Bush administration, for its part, immediately placed the blame squarely on Minnesota's state government. According to the Associated Press, "Bush's spokesman, Tony Snow, said that while the inspection did not indicate the bridge was at risk of failing, 'if an inspection report identifies deficiencies, the state is responsible for taking corrective actions.'"

The truth is there's plenty of blame to go around. The investigators and engineers at the National Transportation Safety Board expect to spend roughly 18 months conducting a thorough investigation into exactly what went wrong. But it's not too early to ask about the decisions and policies that may have contributed to this disaster. After all, there are 1,097 bridges in Minnesota deemed "structurally deficient."

Says one longtime Republican state transportation lobbyist: "To cut to the heart of it: Who's culpable?"

GOVERNOR

Governor Tim Pawlenty addresses the media horde the day after the bridge collapseIn 1999, as state House majority leader, Pawlenty said that he would not support a gas tax increase for freeway lane expansion. In 2001, Pawlenty called the metro's roads a "vehicular prison system." But in both cases, Pawlenty unveiled complicated plans to pour money into the state's road system that, in many regards, didn't come to fruition.

Then Pawlenty emerged as a Republican gubernatorial candidate in 2002. His opponent for the party's nod, Brian Sullivan, outflanked Pawlenty to the right by outspokenly opposing a gas tax increase. Pawlenty followed suit, signing a no-new-taxes pledge with the Taxpayers League, handcuffing his options before he was even elected.

Pawlenty made good on his promise. In 2005 and 2007 the governor gleefully vetoed a gas tax increase, even as Republicans like Ron Erhardt, who was among the sponsors of the measure both times, tried to get Pawlenty to see the necessity of it. "We were quite happy in 2007 because we got a bipartisan plan passed," Erhardt says. "The leadership in this party has dropped the ball on funding transportation issues, just because somebody, a big somebody, signed a no-new-taxes pledge."

A gas tax increase that went to a dedicated fund for transportation could have taken the metro's roadways and transit system out of the 1970s, and into the future. More importantly, the federal government requires that states match funding up to 20 percent to receive money earmarked for transportation infrastructure. "Go ask MnDOT how much money is sitting in Washington for us, that we left on the table because we don't have a gas tax," says a transportation lobbyist.

Mitigating factor: As much as any one person can shoulder the blame, Pawlenty looks culpable. The collapse happened on his watch, after all, and his lieutenant governor, whom he also appointed to be transportation commissioner, was supposed to know about MnDOT's alarming reports. But to his credit, Pawlenty has finally done an about face on the gas tax.

TRANSPORTATION COMMISSIONER

Carol Molnau

Molnau doesn't have the kind of technical background you'd expect from the person responsible for building and maintaining the state's transportation infrastructure. Raised on a farm in Lafayette, Molnau has demonstrated her rural bona fides by milking cows, and once famously beat former Governor Jesse Ventura in a keg-throwing contest.

But after Pawlenty tapped her to be his running mate, and the two breezed into office in 2002, she soon found herself taking on a second job as transportation commissioner. Although it may have seemed an odd fit, the appointment posed two advantages for Pawlenty: It allowed him to cut the $108,000 salary typically paid to someone in that position, and put an anti-tax ally in charge of an agency with an annual budget of $2 billion.

Upon taking over the two roles, Molnau vowed that she would bring "reform and accountability" to MnDOT. It's been all downhill since then. She sparred with the governor over the North Star commuter line, and due to a controversy over bids, delayed the much-needed overhaul of the Crosstown and I-35W Commons south of Minneapolis. Molnau has toed the line against an increase in a gas tax, and spoken out against funding for mass transit, emphasizing politics over policy. As a result, she has overseen the steady decline—by fiscal neglect—of the state's road and bridge infrastructure.

Mitigating factors: Molnau was in China when the bridge collapsed, which is somewhat symbolic of her tenure as transportation commissioner. But it's not her fault she was appointed to a job she wasn't qualified to do. After all, as Molnau told the Star Tribune, "Do I look at the bridge inspection reports? No ... I really believe we have professionals trained to do that."

MnDOT
Less than 24 hours after the bridge collapsed, Dan Dorgan, MnDOT's top bridge engineer, gamely faced a throng of TV cameras and microphones. Sweating profusely, Dorgan looked like a man undergoing an exceptionally painful colonoscopy. Here was a geek used to spending intimate time with bridge blueprints and inspection reports being forced to answer the question on everyone's mind: How could this happen?

Dorgan walked the press through the basics of bridge inspection, detailing the history of the I-35W bridge and defining the suddenly trenchant term "structurally deficient." But when asked if he was convinced that MnDOT had done everything it could to insure that the bridge was structurally sound, Dorgan provided his most revealing answer: "In light of what happened, I would say we thought we had done all we could. Obviously something went terribly wrong."

MnDOT's dysfunction has been well documented. In 2003, the Star Tribune ran a series of stories detailing myriad problems within the agency, from shoddy contracting to profligate spending to low-balling property owners when purchasing land for highways. To cite just one example of misplaced priorities, in 2002 MnDOT paid $10,750 to a conference speaker to detail "The Rise, Fall, and Rise of Harley Davidson."

MnDOT knew there was a problem with the bridge and was in a position to do something about it. In 2006, URS Corporation, one of the largest engineering firms worldwide, released an in-depth study of the I-35W bridge and offered three possible courses of corrective action to ensure the structure's safety. MnDOT, despite heated internal debate, chose the cheapest option: continued inspections.

This decision was made despite numerous obstacles that made meticulous visual examinations of the bridge nearly impossible. In fact, the URS report pointed out that access to some of the most vulnerable portions of the bridge was "very limited." Inspectors struggled with piles of pigeon shit, bats, spider webs, poor lighting, and angry motorists, who occasionally expressed their frustration at lane closures by hurling debris at MnDOT workers.

In sum, MnDOT has all the hallmarks of a paranoid bureaucracy more concerned with safe-guarding its turf and reputation than actually building and maintaining the state's transportation infrastructure. Considering this dysfunctional state of affairs and the chronic under-funding of the department, it's a wonder that more bridges haven't crumbled.

Mitigating factors: MnDOT has no power over budgeting. The agency must make do with the insufficient financial resources allocated by the legislature and the governor. "The professional staff over there assembles the best research that they can," says Rick Krueger, executive director of the Minnesota Transportation Alliance, a coalition of businesses, labor, and local governments that advocates for better roadways. "There's been a glaring lack of funding in transportation investment that needs to be addressed."

The Taxpayers League
Locally, the Taxpayers League led the way for a new era of small-government starve-the-beasters, and no one banged the drum more loudly than its then-president, David Strom. As the 2002 election returns came in and it became clear that Republicans would win big, Strom was not shy in proclaiming victory. "One word: mandate," he told the Star Tribune.

Strom and the league had reason to crow: They helped elect a slew of their candidates, most of them signing a no-new-taxes pledge. Among them was gubernatorial candidate Tim Pawlenty.

In deference to his benefactors, Pawlenty led an unprecedented era of slash-and-burn politics, most of his policies heartily endorsed by Strom. In 2004, for instance, a Metro Transit bus strike instigated by Pawlenty was cheered by Strom and other anti-transit blowhards on the sidelines. And every time Pawlenty vetoed an increase in the gas tax, it wasn't hard to see the governor's pen was being directed by the Taxpayers League.

When word got around last week that Pawlenty was finally considering a gas tax hike in the face of the catastrophe, Strom, who is no longer the president of the league, piped up that Pawlenty had "panicked." But perhaps it's Strom and his ilk who are panicked, after realizing that their brand of bull-headed ideology hamstrings government to the point where it can't perform its most basic function: Protecting the citizenry.

Mitigating factor: Strom has moved on from his post as the head of the Taxpayers League, clearing the way for former State Rep. Phil Krinkie, whose hard-line stance on taxes has earned him the nickname Dr. "No."

STATE HOUSE MINORITY LEADER

Marty Seifert
The House minority leader has been Pawlenty's staunchest deputy in fighting DFL efforts to increase the gas tax in recent years, despite glaring holes in the state's transportation budget. It's now projected that over the next six years there will be an annual funding shortfall of $2.4 billion for transportation projects. Over the next two decades, the funding gap is expected to reach more than $30 billion

Last legislative session, Democrats attempted to staunch the ballooning deficit. The legislature approved a measure that would eventually raise the gas tax by 7.5 cents, which would have been the first gas tax hike since 1988.

But Seifert sneered at even this modest transporation fee. "Joe Sixpack back home does not need more tax increases," he said in March. "This is a morbidly obese tax increase."

Even with Seifert pooh-poohing it, the measure initially cleared the House and Senate with 11 Republican legislators joining their DFL colleagues in voting for it. But the margin in the House was just one vote over the two-thirds threshold needed to override a veto.

After Pawlenty spiked the bill, Seifert led an intense lobbying campaign to convince Republicans not to contradict the Governor. Those who had voted in favor were inundated with phone calls and emails. Eventually four Republicans (Jim Abeler, Bud Heidgerken, Dean Urdahl and Kathy Tingelstad) flipped their votes. The veto held.

"It was a loyalty to the Governor kind of thing," says Rep. Frank Hornstein (DFL-St. Paul), who sits on the transportation finance committee. "This was a huge issue for Marty Seifert."

Following the bridge collapse, Seifert has continued to insist that a gas tax increase is unnecessary.

Mitigating factor: Seifert was merely carrying water for the Governor. His spirited defense was at some level standard partisan politics.

The Bridge Builders
Kurt Fhurman, the inspector responsible for signing off on the I-35W bridge every year since 1994, thinks he knows who is responsible for the collapse.

"Go after the designer," Fhurman angrily told the New York Daily News several days after the collapse. "Go ask him why he did what he did."

The bridge was designed in 1961 by Sverdrup & Parcel, a prominent firm that also designed Busch Stadium in St. Louis, the Superdome in New Orleans, and the Chesapeake Bay Bridge-Tunnel. The bridge was built between 1964 and 1967 by Industrial Construction Company and Hurcon Inc. Both businesses are now defunct.

Even though it's early in the investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board is already raising questions about the bridge's design. One issue of concern: the bridge didn't have any piers built into the riverbed. It also lacked what are commonly referred to as "engineering redundancies"—back-up support built into the system to minimize damage if one part fails.

Last week, the NTSB and Federal Highway Authority focused on so-called gusset plates, steel sheets that connected the bridge's girders together. The inspectors said the plates may have been a design flaw.

Mitigating factor: To be fair, the bridge was built in a dark period of American construction. In the 1960s and early 1970s, builders and policy officials believed engineering had evolved to the point where bridges could be built on the cheap—a notion that disappeared just a few years after the I-35W bridge opened.

Progressive Contractors, Inc.
At the time of the bridge collapse, 18 employees from Progressive Contractors were in the midst of completing $2.4 million in repairs. The St. Michael-based construction company, founded in 1971, had been working on the bridge since early June. For two months, workers drilled into the surface with jackhammers, cut away pavement with saws, and poured concrete.

But what raised eyebrows about the work was the sheer volume of equipment and construction materials deployed on the bridge at the time of collapse. Federal authorities estimate that the bridge was supporting 100 tons of gravel, at least two semitrailers, and an unknown quantity of concrete, which weighs close to 100 pounds per cubic foot. Neither Progressive Contractors nor MnDOT conducted a study to scrutinize how the construction work might impact the bridge's safety.

U.S. Secretary of Transportation Mary Peters highlighted this potential factor in a statement released last week. "Given the questions being raised by the NTSB, it is vital that states remain mindful of the extra weight construction projects place on bridges," she said.

Progressive Contractors, which specializes in bridge and highway construction, maintains that it's not unusual to have that much equipment onsite. "Their people are just as baffled as everyone," says David Lillehaug, the attorney representing the company. "We're just scratching our heads with this."

Progressive Contractors also disputes reports that the bridge had been swaying prior to the collapse. "We have now met with every single worker who was on the bridge when it collapsed. None of them observed or reported any unusual swaying," said Tom Sloan, vice president of the company's bridge division, in a statement released last week.

But Abolhassan Astaneh-Asl, a University of California, Berkeley professor who is a bridge expert, says that construction activities may have been one factor in creating a "perfect storm" that led to the failure of the structure. "The last straw may be the construction," he says.

Mitigating factor: MnDOT's chief bridge engineer, Dan Dorgan, has said the I-35W bridge was built to meet military specifications, meaning that it should have been able to withstand bumper-to-bumper traffic of flatbeds carrying M1 Abrams tanks, which would be significantly heavier than the construction equipment and materials on the bridge at the time of the collapse.

The Previous Administrations
Remember the famous "Jesse Checks" that Governor Ventura put in everyone's mailbox? Those were heady times from 1999 to 2001, when the state was running a surplus and Governor Turnbuckle gave Minnesotans a rebate on sales tax collection. Everyone cheered because Jesse got us our money back.

Turns out popular policy isn't always good policy. Aside from looking wasteful when the state budget bottomed out in 2002, those funds could have gone to a roadway system that everyone knew was badly in need of an overhaul. In 2000, the rebate took some $200 million away from transportation needs. More saliently, Ventura also urged lawmakers to cut license tab registration fees that year, a move that depleted the highway trust fund by some $170 million annually.

Ventura wasn't the only governor who was shortsighted with transportation funding. For years, Arne Carlson said he was against an increase in the gas tax, and though the state Senate passed one in 1997, the measure didn't pass the House because Carlson wouldn't support it. For most of his tenure, Carlson was more interested in using tollbooths as a revenue source, but the idea never took off.

In short, both governors ignored the fact that our roadways were deteriorating.

Mitigating factors: The gas tax, which was last increased in 1988 from 17 to 20 cents a gallon, has long been unpopular with Minnesotans. The state was running budget surpluses during most of Ventura and Carlson's tenures in office, and raising taxes didn't seem necessary.

The Bureaucracy
Aside from a lack of money to get matching funds for federal projects, the many steps required for reviewing and planning Minnesota's roadways and interstates is hopelessly tangled up in red tape.

For example, federal law requires that a regional planning agency oversee transportation dollars sent to the state. For the seven-county Twin Cities area, that agency is the Metropolitan Council. The council takes its cue from the Transportation Advisory Board, which was created by the state legislature in 1974. The board is responsible for reviewing MnDOT plans and reports, and issuing recommendations to the Met Council, which accepts or rejects the board's recommendation as a whole. Then the council takes its case to the legislature and the governor's office, which decide which projects need to be funded.

The biggest problem with the system, of course, is that urgent projects get lost in the bureaucratic shuffle, and pet projects jump to the head of the line—especially new construction rather than repair, because, politically speaking, such ventures are far sexier to lawmakers and constituents alike. In other words, the system is not only arcane, but also highly susceptible to politicization.

Mitigating factors: In recent years, the Met Council has had its work cut out for it, with folks like Pawlenty, Strom, and a host of other local neo-con think-tankers being openly hostile to the regional planning agency. Even if the Met Council and MnDOT had been working in perfect concert and sounding the bells for the right projects at the right time, it's likely their pleas would have fallen on deaf ears.

The Federal Government

Blaming the collapse of a bridge in Minnesota on the war in Iraq might seem like a parody of knee-jerk liberalism, but that doesn't mean there isn't some truth in it.

Of course, inadequate federal funding of transportation infrastructure is a phenomenon that precedes the present administration. Former DFL Sen. Dave Durenberger recalls the same frustration two decades earlier during the Reagan years. "I was trying to get colleagues and the president to see that our federal highway system was deteriorating at an alarming rate, but no one wanted to hear it," he says.

Even so, it's impossible not to think longingly of the $450 billion-plus we've squandered in Iraq. Terrorists might not have blown up the I-35W bridge, but they certainly distracted us from the pressing problems at home.

Mitigating factor: Donald Rumsfeld isn't transportation secretary.

Shiny New Toys
Politicians like to build things. They like ribbon cuttings and newspaper photos and structures bearing their own illustrious names. Proof of this phenomenon? The Robert C. Byrd Institute for Advanced Flexible Manufacturing.

Closer to home, the same phenomenon partly explains why the legislature can find half a billion dollars to spend on the Hiawatha light rail line, but can't scrape up sufficient resources to maintain roads and bridges. Or to cite a more egregious example, it's why, when all is said and done, we will likely have spent somewhere in the area of $2 billion dollars on sports stadiums. Nobody gets a PR boost when MnDOT allocates additional funds to reinforce gusset plates.

"Bridges actually are in better shape than a lot of other parts of our infrastructure," says Kent Harries, a professor of civil and environmental engineering at the University of Pittsburgh. "It's going to get worse, and it's going to get exponentially worse."

Mitigating factor: The argument pitting highways against public transit is wrongheaded. The truth is that substantial investment will have to be made in both to keep up with the state's transportation needs.
It's amazing how a tangle of steel and concrete and bodies in the Mississippi River can concentrate minds and galvanize action.

It wasn't 72 hours after the bridge collapsed that Governor Pawlenty was conceding the need to increase the gas tax. Congress signed off on a $250 million emergency appropriations bill before the week was over. By the end of last week, plans to build a new bridge were on the fast track. The goal is to have it finished by the end of 2008.

The investigation into what went wrong and how to prevent such tragedies in the future is a murkier business. The NTSB immediately had investigators on the ground poking through the wreckage. Eventually, the bridge will be reconstructed, piece by piece, much like a crashed airplane, in an effort to discover which part failed first.

But whatever combination of factors are ultimately deemed to have resulted in the dramatic collapse of the bridge, it may turn out that the biggest problem had nothing to do with concrete or steel but rather something much more human: a failure of planning and public policy.
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