By Martha Estes: March 29, 2012
An "amen chorus" to Timothy B. Lee's article in The Atlantic, The Mirage of Free-Market Roads. martha
March 29, 2012
Acton Institute (blog)by Joe Carter http://blog.acton.org/archives/30879-how-free-market-roads-can-restrict-freedom.html
How “Free-Market Roads” Can Restrict Freedom
In a political climate dominated by debates about individual mandates and restrictions on religious freedoms, an issue like road privatization isn’t likely to be on the top of anyone’s list of major concerns. But the excellent post on “The Mirage of Free-Market Roads” by Timothy B. Lee, a writer with Ars Technica and the Cato Institute, is worth reading even if you don’t care about toll roads. Lee provides an intriguing example of why we need to think clearly about how we apply principles to policy:
While I’m generally sympathetic to the idea of privately-managed roads, I’ve become convinced that the broader vision of “free-market roads” is a conceptual confusion. In the abstract, the idea of competing, privately-owned roads has a lot of appeal. But the more I think about it, the less sense it makes. Roads are deeply intertwined with governments. They always have been and as far as I can see they always will be. This means that they’ll never be truly private in the sense that other private companies like restaurants or shoe factors can be.
Assembling the land needed for a long-distance road is prohibitively expensive without government assistance. Unsurprisingly, private roads almost never come into existence without extensive government assistance. And that means that the profitability of a “private” road depends crucially on how many competing roads the government allows to exist.
It’s unsurprising, then, that real-world privatization schemes are often explicitly protectionist. A 2004 GAO survey found that four of the five privately-funded toll road projects started or completed in the preceding 15 years included non-compete clauses that restricted the creation of competing freeways nearby. It’s much easier to turn a profit when would-be competitors are barred from entering the market.
[. . .]
To be clear, this isn’t to say libertarians should oppose road privatization. To the contrary, private road management can be an excellent way to bring private capital and technical expertise to the provision of a public service. But it is to say that private road operators should be viewed as providing a service to the government, rather than operating an ordinary private business. [emphasis added]
Lee touches on one of the disturbing ironies of modern politics: purportedly “free-market” approaches can sometimes lead to more government involvement and greater restrictions on freedom. Those of us on the right side of the political spectrum have always been wary of government. But it’s refreshing to see that many of us are also becoming more aware of the dangers of rent-seeking behavior by crony capitalists.
Thursday, March 29, 2012
Friday, December 16, 2011
Thursday, September 22, 2011
Westchester Gasette: Oh, My.
Westchester Gasette: Oh, My.: So here's Part 2 of that story about an Arlington Church's business deal with Chesapeake: Wednesday, August 31, 2011 High Point Church...
Westchester Gasette: What the Quack is Going On?
Westchester Gasette: What the Quack is Going On?: The 5,000-member High Point Church was founded in 2000 by Simons and his wife, April, whose brother is Joel Osteen , well-k...
Sunday, September 18, 2011
Thursday, September 8, 2011
Sunday, August 28, 2011
Westchester Gasette: It's a Hurricane
Westchester Gasette: It's a Hurricane: A LANDMAN on the Arlington, TX City Council?? Or What Is It, Pray Tell? The Councilman does have a very nice résumé. Here's how you,...
Sunday, October 10, 2010
Wednesday, October 6, 2010
Zoning
NEW YORK TIMES QUOTATION OF THE DAY (applies also to life in the Barnett Shale ... only we don't have a ferry boat)
"The quality of life that we came here for was quiet. You don’t live in a place where you have to take an hour-and-15-minute ferry ride to live next to an industrial park. And that’s where we are right now."
CHERYL LINDGREN, who lives near wind turbines in Vinalhaven, Me.
"The quality of life that we came here for was quiet. You don’t live in a place where you have to take an hour-and-15-minute ferry ride to live next to an industrial park. And that’s where we are right now."
CHERYL LINDGREN, who lives near wind turbines in Vinalhaven, Me.
Tuesday, September 7, 2010
Saturday, August 14, 2010
Tuesday, August 10, 2010
TTC-35 officially declared DEAD by Feds
By Terri Hall - TURF - Aug. 2010
Attorney Fred Kelly Grant, who's with TURF partner, American Stewards of Liberty, was instrumental in forming the Eastern Central Texas Sub-Regional Planning Commission (dubbed 391 commissions) that's credited with this victory. He's analyzed the Federal Highway Administration official Record of Decision (ROD) below.
Margaret Byfield, Co-Founder of American Stewards of Liberty, added:
The following is from Insider Texas Government Strategic Partnerships, Inc. Link to article directly here...
FHA declares Trans-Texas Corridor proposal officially dead
Latest I-35 project includes expansion to six lanes through areas of Central Texas
Attorney Fred Kelly Grant, who's with TURF partner, American Stewards of Liberty, was instrumental in forming the Eastern Central Texas Sub-Regional Planning Commission (dubbed 391 commissions) that's credited with this victory. He's analyzed the Federal Highway Administration official Record of Decision (ROD) below.
"The Federal Highway Administration has pounded the final nail in the coffin of the Trans-Texas Corridor-35. The Agency’s final Record of Decision, issued on July 20, 2010 selected the No Action Alternative but went further in ordering that 'a study area for the TTC-35 Project will not be chosen and the TTC-35 Project is concluded.' Twice the ROD states that the 'project is concluded,' and six times it states that 'the project ends.' If TxDOT attempted to revive the 35 Corridor project and use the same EIS, this ROD would provide the base for issuance by a United States District Judge of a Declaratory Judgment prohibiting the action.” -- Fred Kelly Grant, Attorney, American Stewards of Liberty
Margaret Byfield, Co-Founder of American Stewards of Liberty, added:
"They didn’t withdraw the study as requested, but wrote the ROD in such a way that TxDOT cannot use this study in the future."
The following is from Insider Texas Government Strategic Partnerships, Inc. Link to article directly here...
FHA declares Trans-Texas Corridor proposal officially dead
Latest I-35 project includes expansion to six lanes through areas of Central Texas
The death certificate for the Trans-Texas Corridor (TTC) has officially been signed.
The oft-maligned TTC project pushed by Gov. Rick Perry would have routed traffic around population centers and provided a broad corridor to link major cities. It also would have included toll roads for cars and trucks, space parallel to the corridor for utilities and tracks for freight and passenger trains.
The demise of the project began when public hearings were held throughout the state. Thousands of citizens voiced their opposition to the TTC, citing the fact that too much private property would be taken for the project. Others objected to plans to involve a consortium that included a Spanish company for part of the $175 billion, 4,000-mile network and wanted more of the proceeds from any toll roads to go into state coffers.
After hearing the complaints, Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) Executive Director Amadeo Saenz, in 2009 declared, "The Trans-Texas Corridor as it is known, no longer exists."
And just last week, the Federal Highway Administration (FHA) issued an official decision of "no action" on the TTC proposal, which prevents the project from going forward. It also cancels the planning comprehensive development agreement between TxDOT and the Spanish construction company.
"A study area for the TTC-35 project will not be chosen," reads the decision, and the TTC-35 project is concluded." While the FHA acknowledged that "transportation needs exist" along the corridor, "those needs will have to be addressed by transportation projects other than TTC-35." The FHA decision was based on comments at public hearings that decried a possible reduction in land values. The federal agency noted that the magnitude of the potential impact on land values was "unprecedented" because of the size of the study area - 400 to 500 miles long and 5,000-6,000 square miles in area - because of the approximately 1 million people who could be affected by the project and the projected 50 years necessary to complete the project.
Although the TTC proposal is officially dead, segments of the I-35 corridor are currently under construction as a project continues that will expand the interstate to six lanes through Central Texas from Hillsboro to San Antonio. TxDOT has already put $1 billion in the bank toward that project. The nearly 100-mile length of the project is expected to take three to five years to complete.
On Monday, a third 2010 project on the Central Texas plan began in Bell County, where the expansion to six lanes will cover an area from FM 2484 north of Salado to Highway 190 in Belton. The 8-mile, $107 million project (paid for in part by federal Recovery Act funds) is expected to be completed in approximately four years.
Earlier this month, a project began between Hillsboro and Abbott. It is the first stage of the widening of I-35 in that area to three lanes in each direction. The first phase includes moving and widening the frontage roads along the highway. And in May, two ramps onto I-35 in Waco were closed and will remain closed for approximately one year as new southbound lanes are constructed.
As TxDOT continues to seek more input from citizens, Texans are helping develop a plan for the future of the I-35 corridor. The result – MY 35, a plan featuring local input based on local needs.
Wednesday, July 14, 2010
Sunday, July 11, 2010
Divided Fort Worth office of SEC was plagued by inaction
BY DARREN BARBEE - July 11, 2010 - Fort Worth Star Telegram
FORT WORTH -- Julie Preuitt is into NASCAR, stopping con men and doing what she believes is right -- even when it meant flushing her career down the SEC commode.
She was an SEC branch chief examining securities brokers and dealers when a routine look at a company put her on high alert. Preuitt believed her staff had found a scam: An off-shore bank was offering CDs with payoffs that were, to her thinking, "absolutely ludicrous."
It should have been a Tom Clancy moment. But in the Fort Worth regional office of the Securities and Exchange Commission where Preuitt worked, leaders regarded the case as what they called a "goat screw." They passed on orders to kill it.
Snap a picture: It's June 2009. The SEC announces bad news for a Texas billionaire. He's being sued, accusing of running a Ponzi scheme that any aspiring Bernie Madoff could appreciate. Singled out for hard work on the case was the Fort Worth office. Plaudits went to many, including two high-ranking Fort Worth officials.
What the picture doesn't show: The lawsuit against R. Allen Stanford came 12 years and about $7 billion too late.
And the praise didn't go to Preuitt, who first raised concerns in 1997. Instead, two people who pushed Preuitt aside enjoyed the acclaim. That is, until it began biting them on the ankles.
Soon after the announcement, the SEC's watchdog, the inspector general, began getting complaints that the office had not diligently pursued a probe until the SEC came under fire for failing to spot Madoff's Ponzi scheme.
Now, a starkly different image of the Fort Worth office is emerging from the watchdog report, government documents obtained by the Star-Telegram, and interviews with current and former staff members.
They show a troubled organization where senior managers for years resisted efforts to pursue complex cases in favor of the quick and easy that could run up its stats -- and they badly botched the Stanford case in its early years.
While Preuitt and the examination staff repeatedly flagged the Stanford companies as a Ponzi scheme, enforcement attorneys wouldn't budge. They ignored tips, largely disregarded state and federal concerns, and tried to fob off the matter to a private, less powerful financial regulator. The enforcement staff failed twice to read examiners' reports on Stanford.
All the while, investor losses swelled, the watchdog report says.
While the Fort Worth office was once gun-shy, SEC officials say those failings have largely been resolved since leadership changed and investigative powers were streamlined. They also say that the matter was complex, entangled in international law and a criminal investigation by the Justice Department, among other obstacles.
"To the extent that there are personnel or other issues, those will be dealt with appropriately," he said. But "the performance of the office has been overwhelmingly positive."
Less focus is now placed on competing with other SEC offices' statistics for the number of cases closed, an SEC document says.
And Rose Romero, a former assistant U.S. prosecutor who now leads the Fort Worth office, said it is operating at its peak in spotting and stopping fraud, even though it has limited resources and a broad region.
The office has rolled out some solid cases. Last year, it halted what it called frauds of $31 million, $24 million and $8.4 million, among others in Texas. An investigator even used Google to root out fraud at a major company.
Yet Romero and Kimberly Garber, who beat out Preuitt to become associate district administrator for examinations, are criticized by current and former staff members as being even more concerned with style over substance. When Preuitt opposed their decision to conduct quick-hit examination reviews, the office divided into two camps.
And Romero and Garber struck back, according to the inspector general.
Some staff members, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said they have no confidence in senior leadership. In Fort Worth, the office's strength had historically been in people like Preuitt, who were impolitic, willing to speak their minds and push co-workers and the D.C. bureaucracy to get things done. Management instead wants "tools to do away with people who have a dissenting opinion," one employee said.
And a lingering issue is how Romero has depicted the Stanford investigation. Testimony she gave to a U.S. Senate committee conflicts with records of her own office.
Apparent red flags
To its earliest investors, Stanford International Bank must have looked like some West Indies gold mine. The Antigua bank offered CDs paying interest rates markedly higher than those of U.S. banks. The Stanford Group Co., which registered with the SEC as a broker-dealer and investment adviser in 1995, was paid high referral fees for selling the CDs.
As early as the mid-1990s, the Texas State Securities Board passed along a tip to the SEC about Robert Allen Stanford's companies.
By 1997, the Stanford companies caught Preuitt's attention. She wondered how the bank had gained nearly $307 million in deposits in a couple of years.
The watchdog report on Stanford details dogged efforts by Preuitt and the examination staff over ensuring years to find answers and prod enforcement to take action.
The first examination found apparent red flags. Preuitt concluded that the CDs were fraudulent. The staff labeled it a "Possible Ponzi scheme." The examination report was forwarded to enforcement, where it sat for eight months.
Read more in the Fort Worth Star Telegram
FORT WORTH -- Julie Preuitt is into NASCAR, stopping con men and doing what she believes is right -- even when it meant flushing her career down the SEC commode.
She was an SEC branch chief examining securities brokers and dealers when a routine look at a company put her on high alert. Preuitt believed her staff had found a scam: An off-shore bank was offering CDs with payoffs that were, to her thinking, "absolutely ludicrous."
It should have been a Tom Clancy moment. But in the Fort Worth regional office of the Securities and Exchange Commission where Preuitt worked, leaders regarded the case as what they called a "goat screw." They passed on orders to kill it.
Snap a picture: It's June 2009. The SEC announces bad news for a Texas billionaire. He's being sued, accusing of running a Ponzi scheme that any aspiring Bernie Madoff could appreciate. Singled out for hard work on the case was the Fort Worth office. Plaudits went to many, including two high-ranking Fort Worth officials.
What the picture doesn't show: The lawsuit against R. Allen Stanford came 12 years and about $7 billion too late.
And the praise didn't go to Preuitt, who first raised concerns in 1997. Instead, two people who pushed Preuitt aside enjoyed the acclaim. That is, until it began biting them on the ankles.
Soon after the announcement, the SEC's watchdog, the inspector general, began getting complaints that the office had not diligently pursued a probe until the SEC came under fire for failing to spot Madoff's Ponzi scheme.
Now, a starkly different image of the Fort Worth office is emerging from the watchdog report, government documents obtained by the Star-Telegram, and interviews with current and former staff members.
They show a troubled organization where senior managers for years resisted efforts to pursue complex cases in favor of the quick and easy that could run up its stats -- and they badly botched the Stanford case in its early years.
"The commission is very interested in a 'fraud of the day.' And [Stanford] wasn't ever the fraud of the day," Preuitt told the inspector general.
Stanford steadfastly maintains he did nothing wrong.
While Preuitt and the examination staff repeatedly flagged the Stanford companies as a Ponzi scheme, enforcement attorneys wouldn't budge. They ignored tips, largely disregarded state and federal concerns, and tried to fob off the matter to a private, less powerful financial regulator. The enforcement staff failed twice to read examiners' reports on Stanford.
All the while, investor losses swelled, the watchdog report says.
While the Fort Worth office was once gun-shy, SEC officials say those failings have largely been resolved since leadership changed and investigative powers were streamlined. They also say that the matter was complex, entangled in international law and a criminal investigation by the Justice Department, among other obstacles.
"I would say the public has every reason to be confident in both the performance and productivity of that office," said Robert Khuzami, head of the SEC's enforcement division in Washington
"To the extent that there are personnel or other issues, those will be dealt with appropriately," he said. But "the performance of the office has been overwhelmingly positive."
Less focus is now placed on competing with other SEC offices' statistics for the number of cases closed, an SEC document says.
And Rose Romero, a former assistant U.S. prosecutor who now leads the Fort Worth office, said it is operating at its peak in spotting and stopping fraud, even though it has limited resources and a broad region.
"I think right now our staff is probably the best qualified staff that this office has probably ever seen," she said.
The office has rolled out some solid cases. Last year, it halted what it called frauds of $31 million, $24 million and $8.4 million, among others in Texas. An investigator even used Google to root out fraud at a major company.
Yet Romero and Kimberly Garber, who beat out Preuitt to become associate district administrator for examinations, are criticized by current and former staff members as being even more concerned with style over substance. When Preuitt opposed their decision to conduct quick-hit examination reviews, the office divided into two camps.
And Romero and Garber struck back, according to the inspector general.
Some staff members, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said they have no confidence in senior leadership. In Fort Worth, the office's strength had historically been in people like Preuitt, who were impolitic, willing to speak their minds and push co-workers and the D.C. bureaucracy to get things done. Management instead wants "tools to do away with people who have a dissenting opinion," one employee said.
And a lingering issue is how Romero has depicted the Stanford investigation. Testimony she gave to a U.S. Senate committee conflicts with records of her own office.
Apparent red flags
To its earliest investors, Stanford International Bank must have looked like some West Indies gold mine. The Antigua bank offered CDs paying interest rates markedly higher than those of U.S. banks. The Stanford Group Co., which registered with the SEC as a broker-dealer and investment adviser in 1995, was paid high referral fees for selling the CDs.
As early as the mid-1990s, the Texas State Securities Board passed along a tip to the SEC about Robert Allen Stanford's companies.
"We actually found problems with Stanford," said Texas Securities Commissioner Denise Voigt Crawford.
By 1997, the Stanford companies caught Preuitt's attention. She wondered how the bank had gained nearly $307 million in deposits in a couple of years.
The watchdog report on Stanford details dogged efforts by Preuitt and the examination staff over ensuring years to find answers and prod enforcement to take action.
The first examination found apparent red flags. Preuitt concluded that the CDs were fraudulent. The staff labeled it a "Possible Ponzi scheme." The examination report was forwarded to enforcement, where it sat for eight months.
Read more in the Fort Worth Star Telegram
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